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Abstract
This empirical analysis uses daily data sets to study hedging activity of major US airlines during 1996-2005 to
examine whether hedging is a value added activity as perceived by the investors. The US airline industry
presents a good environment to measure the risk exposure due to changes in jet fuel prices. Fuel price risk is
omnipresent across the industry. Given jet fuel price volatility, airlines have an incentive to find value in
hedging future prices of jet fuel. The research does not find a reason that would contradict the economic
fundamentals of hedging; airline stock returns are negatively related to percentage changes in jet fuel prices,
on average. However, looking at daily returns of jet fuel and stock prices, we do not find a significant
correlation that can be used to support the theorized sensitivity. This result is consistent with the assertion
that the benefit of hedging is of a limited value to the investors who seek a combination of stocks that will
reduce the overall risk exposure of the portfolio rather than the risk inherent in this or that individual firm.
This article is available in Undergraduate Economic Review: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/9
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Jet fuel prices have been substantially volatile throughout the last decade. 
Between the years 1996 and 2005, a barrel of crude oil was traded at a price range 
between $10.82 and $69.91.  The fluctuation in crude oil prices certainly has an impact 
on airline industry operations as fuel costs on average represent 16.29% of total airline 
operating expenses (See Table One).  A recent article in The Wall Street Journal lists the 
airline industry as the likely beneficiary of oil price decreases1.  Because the airline 
industry’s operations depend heavily on crude oil, major airlines’ profits could climb 
when their own cost drops, as fuel prices fall.  Furthermore, according to a study of 
trading patterns by Bianco Research LLC, the airline sector is most inversely correlated 
to oil prices2.  Thus, the drop in commodity prices pushes investors to search airlines’ 
stocks.  To mitigate the risk of fuel exposure, some airlines have used derivatives to lock 
in the price.  As such, this temporary protection will shield airlines from high energy 
costs, but also might keep them from enjoying lower costs when the crude price falls. 
 This paper investigates the fuel hedging behavior of major airlines in the US 
during the 1996-2005 period to examine whether such hedging has an effect on stock 
prices of these airlines.  Since airline jet fuel prices are hedgeable, some investors might 
find value in an airline’s attempt to hedge future prices of jet fuel.  That will be the truth 
only if the use of a hedging strategy is positively correlated with a firm’s value.  As a 
result, the underlying price of the airline stock that has a hedging program in place would 
have higher intrinsic value, as its underinvestment cost is reduced.  By the same token, 
the variability of the stock should be reduced as the price of jet fuel is fixed.  Thus, the 
stock of airlines that engage in hedging is perceived as less risky.  The research, contrary 
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to the notion of a positive relationship between hedging and value, shows that hedging is 
not valued by the investors as reflected in the price of a stock.  While using derivatives to 
hedge jet fuel costs might increase firm value, it is of little importance for investors as 
their returns do not depend on whether the airline implements the hedging strategy.  
Individual shareholders are primarily concerned with the cumulative risk exposure of 
their portfolios rather than with individual stocks. 
 
Literature Review 
 Recent literature has made progress in understanding why firms may hedge.  Most 
of the research focuses on the notion that hedging increases firm value.  Based on the 
results, one can divide the literature into three distinctive groups.  The first group of 
researchers concludes that hedging results in higher firm value.   The second group 
interprets the hedging as a non-value added activity, while the others argue that hedging 
creates value only under some circumstances.  The three distinctive groups and their 
findings are described in the paragraphs that follow. 
 Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that firms can increase value by hedging.  They 
found that by reducing the probability of bankruptcy, hedging can increase firm value.  
This effect is larger for firms with higher costs of financial distress.  Further, Stulz (1996) 
classifies the failure to invest in valuable projects due to debt as financial distress costs.  
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) build on the Smith and Stulz model, illustrating the 
value of hedging for firms facing financial constraints.  In his research, he found that 
hedging is more valuable to firms as investment opportunities are inversely correlated 
2
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with the risk factor’s cash flow.  In the other words, hedging reduces the need to access 
outside capital during the periods it is most expensive. 
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2002, 2006) find that airline industry investment 
opportunities correlate positively with jet fuel costs, while higher fuel costs are consistent 
with lower cash flow.  The results of their studies show that jet fuel hedging is positively 
related to airline firm value, as it comes from reduction of underinvestment costs.  
However, the model used by Carter, Rogers, and Simkins might not be applicable in the 
case of the airline industry and it can yield inaccurate results.  The standardized monthly 
market model used in their studies has been applicable to currency and gold price 
exposure to risk.  It has not yet been determined that this model can accurately predict the 
airline exposure to jet fuel price changes.  Another potential problem in the Carter, 
Rogers, and Simkins studies can be found in the variables used in the model.  The CRSP 
value-weighted market portfolio might be a poor estimate of the market return. Most of 
the investors base their financial decisions on more general indexes like the S&P 5003.  In 
addition, using the change in jet fuel price might not adequately reflect the airline 
industry as jet fuel contracts do not exist in the United States4.  In reality, futures on 
crude oil are used to hedge jet fuel purchases. This relatively small change in the 
variables might have an impact on the model.  Also, the study done by Carter, Rogers, 
and Simkins does not address periods of low jet fuel prices.  According to Energy 
Information Administration a gallon of jet fuel was traded at $0.62 on January 2, 1996, 
compared to $1.78 on December 30, 2005.  It yet has to be determined that jet fuel 
hedging adds value when the jet fuel prices drop. 
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 Jin and Jorion (2004) found that, although hedging reduces the firm’s stock price 
sensitivity to oil and gas prices, it does not affect the market value of the firm.  Contrary 
to Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, they use the S&P 500 as the stock market index and the 
futures contract for oil in their model.  Thus, the two factor model provides for a more 
realistic approach in measurement of the price exposure.  However, Jin and Jorion 
exclude credit rating as one of the factors in their studies.  Since hedging requires 
financial commitment, credit worthy firms are more likely to hedge.  This can create 
some distortion in the results as indicated by Allayannis and Weston (2001) who find a 
positive relation between currency hedging and Tobin’s Q.  The difference between the 
studies can be attributed to the commodity risk exposure itself.  Some investors might 
find it relatively easy and inexpensive to hedge their own risk.  It yet has to be 
determined how investors perceive the jet fuel exposure risk. 
 Morrell and Swan (2005) find in their studies weak empirical justification behind 
hedging.  According to the researchers, hedging on average smoothes or exacerbates 
airline profit cycles, but it depends on the time period used in the research.  The only time 
it would create exceptional value is when an airline is on the verge of bankruptcy, a 
theory difficult to believe.  Airlines close to bankruptcy simply are not creditworthy and 
cannot obtain funds for the margin requirement.  In conclusion, Morrell and Swan state 
that hedging is a signal to investors that management is technically alert.  Although it 
cannot be explained by a mathematical or economic model, it can be just the psychology 
of the market that pushes airline hedging.  Thus, there is no clear link between jet fuel 
hedging and market value of the firm as there are too many simultaneously operating 
factors. 
4
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Industry 
 The US airline industry presents a good environment to measure the risk exposure 
due to changes in jet fuel prices.  Fuel price risk is omnipresent across the industry.  
Because fuel prices are more volatile than other airline costs, hedging stabilizes overall 
costs and profitability.  Also, it is not possible in the short run to pass the higher fuel 
prices on to passengers due to the highly competitive nature of the industry.  The 
underlying implications are that hedging reduces risk exposure due to changes in jet fuel 
price and maximizes firm’s value.  Maximization results in higher stock prices, because 
investors perceive risk as a cost.  To mitigate the risk and prevent swings in operating 
expenses and bottom-line profitability, airlines engage in hedging using various 
instruments5. 
 The plain vanilla energy swap is an agreement whereby a floating price is fixed 
over a certain period of time.  This transfer does not require the physical item and is not 
reported on the balance sheet.  The contract is settled by transfer of cash, which is 
determined as the difference between fixed and floating prices. Similar to plain vanilla, a 
differential swap is based on the difference between a fixed differential for two different 
commodities and their actual differential over time. Thus, the airline can hedge by use of 
a commodity other than jet fuel price.  Differential swaps eliminate the risk that jet fuel 
prices will increase more than the underlying commodity. 
 A call option is the right to buy the underlying asset at a predetermined price at a 
time up to the maturity date.  Generally, over-the-counter options are settled in cash, 
while exchange-traded oil options on NYMEX are exercised into future contracts. 
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Oftentimes, the settlement price is based on the average price for a period.  Because call 
options are relatively expensive due to the volatility of energy commodities, many 
airlines use zero-cost collars instead. 
 A collar is a combination of a put option and a call option, where the put option is 
sold at the strike price below the current commodity price and the call option is 
purchased at a strike price above the current commodity price.  The collar option 
provides protection from upward movement in the prices of the underlying commodity.  
The premium received from the sale of put option helps offset the cost of the call option.  
Also, the airline locks the price between the minimum and maximum over the period of 
time the options are outstanding. When the price received from the sale of a put option 
equals the price paid for call option a “zero cost collar” results.  Using a zero-cost collar 
does not require upfront expense cost.   
 A futures contract is an agreement whereby a buyer and seller commit to buy or 
sell a specified quantity and quality of a commodity at specified price at the future date.  
The seller who takes a short position agrees to deliver the commodity.  The buyer takes a 
long position and agrees to purchase the commodity.  Forward contracts are similar to 
futures, but with exceptions that they are standardized and traded on organized 
exchanges.  While futures might require daily payment of price adjustments, forwards are 
settled at the maturity date.  Thus, futures and forwards can be used by the airlines as a 
tool that mitigates the risk exposure of jet fuel price changes6. 
 
Derivative Accounting 
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 To better understand how investors perceive hedging, it is necessary to discuss 
how derivatives are accounted for. The Financial Accounting Standard Board issued 
Statement 133 that requires the recording of changes in the derivative’s fair value to be 
recorded in either the income statement when realized or as “other comprehensive” 
income.  As a result, derivative instruments are presented at fair market value on the 
balance sheet, but any unrealized changes in net market value are not reported on the 
income statement.  Also, hedging effectiveness takes into consideration historical 
performance of the airline and anticipated future performance.  This helps to determine if 
the hedges are deemed to be effective.  Although it is beyond the scope of this study to 
explain in depth all the accounting behind derivatives, it is important to know that any 
amount of jet fuel hedged that is not consumed by the airline in a given period will 
appear as a charge on the income statement.  Thus, the airlines never hedge the entire 
100% of their fuel needs7. 
 
Data 
 The analysis is performed on publicly held US major passenger airlines between 
the years 1996 and 2005.  The 10-K filings of these firms provide the data regarding fuel 
hedging as a percentage of next year’s fuel requirements, fuel as a percentage of 
operating expense, and total asset value.  The daily spot price of jet fuel and crude oil was 
obtained from the Energy Information Administration, while the daily stock prices of 
airlines were downloaded from the Yahoo Finance Database.  The following nine airlines 
are included in the study: American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Delta Air Lines, 
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Northwest Airlines, Continental Airlines, Alaska Air Group, US Airways Group, Airtran 
Holdings, and JetBlue.  Seven airlines disclose adequate levels of data for the analysis, 
while US Airways Group’s daily stock price was not accessible and JetBlue trading 
history does not go beyond year 2002.   
 The airlines’ 10-K filings and management discussion of operations suggests that 
fuel price risk is of significant importance.  For the full sample of firm observations, fuel 
costs averaged 16.29% of operating expenses between 1996-2005 (See Table One).  The 
percentages range from 13.8% (Delta Air Lines) to 23.57% (Airtran Holdings).  The 
sample’s hedging as a percentage of next year’s fuel requirement averaged 26.91% for 
the period 1996-2005 (See Table Two).  The percentage ranges from 4% for Airtran 
Holdings to 60.80% for Southwest Airlines.  While all airlines hedged during the entire 
study period, only American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, US Airways Group, and 
JetBlue always had hedges in place at the end of every year covered in the studies.  The 
data also reveals wide variations in the amount of fuel hedged by each airline.  Although, 
there has been movement among airlines to increase the maximum length of hedging 
horizons, the majority of them do not use derivatives with a maturity in excess of one 
year. 
 In addition to 10-K filings, the analysis takes into consideration any airline 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Currently, airlines are allowed to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in order to restructure and reorganize, while being protected from the creditors.  
Additional competitive pressure is therefore experienced by the airlines that do not 
operate under Chapter 11.  As one observer noted: “Chapter 11 allows airlines to go into 
file [sic] for bankruptcy, put its house in order, cut costs and therefore rival other airlines 
8
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who in turn end up in bankruptcy because they had to cut costs in order to keep up with 
the competition.”8  As Barla and Koo (1999) find in their studies, bankrupt airlines are 
able to lower their operating costs and these cost reductions are partially translated into 
lower prices.  Thus, price competition in the highly competitive airline industry 
contributed to the financial losses.  Airlines might consciously elect not to hedge, as the 
future price increases in jet fuel might be offset by bankruptcy court-approved rejections 
of onerous or costly contracts. As a result, bankrupt airlines that restructured their labor 
and other contracts might have an advantage over the airline(s) that did not file for 
Chapter 11. 
  
Analysis 
 So far, it can be noted that the airline industry appears to view volatile jet fuel 
prices as a source of risk exposure.  Next the model that takes into consideration jet fuel 
return factor is developed.  For each firm-year in the sample, the following time-series 
regression is estimated using daily data points: 
Ret = α + γRejt + βRemt +εt   
where Ret is the total stock rate of return for firm in day t, Rejt is the percentage change in 
US Gulf Coast Kerosene – Type Jet Fuel spot prices obtained from the Energy 
Information Administration, Remt is the daily rate of change in the stock market index, 
represented here by the S&P 500 index, and εt is the idiosyncratic error term.   
 The regression analysis of American Airlines reveals the following results: Ret = 
0.00062 – 0.18Rejt + 1.48Remt + εt (See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at 
α=.10 (two tailed test).  With an R-square of 19%, the model is limited in its ability to 
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explain changes in the return of stock prices of American Airlines.  This would seem 
reasonable, as American Airlines hedged its expected fuel requirements for all the years 
in the study period.  Therefore, its stock price should be less responsive to changes in jet 
fuel prices.  In addition, its consumption of fuel as percentage of operating expenses is 
below the average.  The analysis uses the following assumption to measure fuel-
efficiency.  Airlines control their own expenses, but cannot control their revenues due to 
the highly competitive nature of the industry.  Airlines engage in hedging to reduce fuel 
expenditures and increase fuel-efficiency as measured by the percentage of operating 
expenses.  It should be stated this assumption does not consider whether the airlines use 
less fuel per dollar of revenue, or simply are less efficient in controlling other costs as 
compared to its competitors.  Other variables used to measure fuel efficiency include 
gallons per passenger mile or expenditures per passenger mile.  Since American Airlines 
is more fuel-efficient compared to the average airline as measured by the fuel expense as 
percentage of operating expense, it is rational that its stock price is not as vulnerable to 
jet fuel price changes.  American Airlines never has filed for bankruptcy, thus it can be 
perceived by investors as a more stable firm.  This might explain why the regression 
equation explains only 19% of the variation in the stock price, using the percentage 
changes in jet fuel and S&P 500 as the independent variables. 
 The regression analysis of Southwest Airlines shows the following results Ret = 
0.00052 – 0.04Rejt + 0.98Remt + εt (See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at 
α=.10 (two tailed test).    While an R-square of 21% suggests this model is somewhat 
better than the American Airlines model, it is still limited in its ability to explain changes 
in the return of stock prices of Southwest Airlines.  Similarly to American Airlines, 
10
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Southwest Airlines hedged its expected fuel requirements throughout the study period.  
The airline had hedged significantly more than any other airline in the studies consulted.  
In addition, Southwest’s consumption of fuel as percentage of operating expenses is 
below the average.  Both of these factors have a direct effect on the vulnerability of the 
stock price to fuel cost swings.  Southwest did not file for bankruptcy either and can be 
perceived by investors as the airline most capable of swallowing margin calls on fuel 
futures contracts.  This might explain the 21% R-square, as other factors like a 
homogenous fleet can help keep the costs under control. 
The Delta Air Lines analysis produced the following outcome: Ret = 0.0011 – 
0.11Rejt + 1.26Remt + εt (See Table Four).  As before, the coefficients are significant at 
α=.10 (two tailed test).   Delta’s R-square of 16% is somewhat disappointing in its ability 
to explain the variations in the stock price returns of this airline.  During the study period, 
Delta hedged its expected fuel requirements annually with the exception of one year.  On 
average, the airline hedged significantly more of its fuel use than any other airline in the 
studies. Amazingly, Delta has hedged more than American and less than Southwest.  
Consistent with the theory that hedging has an impact on stock variability, Delta’s jet fuel 
coefficient falls between that of American and Southwest.  In addition, Delta Air Lines’ 
consumption of fuel as percentage of operating expenses is the lowest in the sample.  
Both of these factors have direct effect on the vulnerability of its stock prices.  Delta Air 
Lines did file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the fall of 2005 and can be 
perceived by investors as a less creditworthy firm.  Thus, the airline might not face some 
increased stock variability due to the uncertainty of its future.     
11
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The regression analysis of Northwest Airlines reveals the equation Ret = 0.0013 – 
0.06Rejt + 1.33Remt + εt (See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at α=.10 (two 
tailed test).   With an R- square of 14%, the model is significantly less useful to explain 
changes in the return of stock prices of Northwest Airlines.  The small jet fuel coefficient 
seems unreasonable, as Northwest Airlines is a below-average hedger, compared to the 
other airlines.  Nevertheless, its stock prices are less responsive due to changes in jet fuel 
prices.  In addition, its consumption of fuel as a percentage of operating expenses is 
above the average.  Since Northwest is less fuel-efficient compared to the average airline, 
one needs to seek some other explanation to determine the reason for the lower 
vulnerability in stock prices.  Northwest, like Delta Air Lines, was during part of the 
study period in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.  Thus, benefiting from the court 
protection, the airline could reorganize its debt structure.  Also, as can be seen from the 
data, Northwest hedged during the years with low jet fuel prices, but did not hedge in the 
years where jet fuel prices were high.  Thus, Northwest’s successful hedging strategy 
allowed the airline to enjoy the low vulnerability of its stock prices. 
Continental Airlines’ regression equation is Ret = 0.0004 – 0.10Rejt + 0.99Remt + εt 
(See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at α=.10 (two tailed test). The R-square 
of 10% is yet again disappointingly weak. This appears counterintuitive, as Continental 
Airlines did not hedge its expected fuel requirements for every one of the years in the 
study period.  Therefore, we would expect its stock price to be more responsive due to 
changes in jet fuel prices.  In addition, similar to Northwest, its consumption of fuel as a 
percentage of operating expenses is above the average.  Since Continental Airlines is less 
fuel efficient compared to the average airline, it is strange that its stock prices are not as 
12
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vulnerable to jet fuel changes.  Continental Airlines twice filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection prior to the study period.  However, like Northwest Airlines, Continental did 
not hedge during the years when the jet fuel price was the highest.  The successful 
hedging strategy might have contributed to the stabilization of its stock prices. 
The regression analysis for Alaska Air Group shows that Ret = 0.004 -0.06Rejt + 
1.08Remt + εt (See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at α=.10 (two tailed test).  
The R-square of 21% is somewhat more robust in explaining jet fuel returns changes 
compared to the case of other airlines.  Although Alaska Air Group did not hedge 
between 1996 and 2000, it implemented a hedging program thereafter.  Nevertheless, its 
average hedging as a percentage of next year’s fuel requirements is below that of the 
study sample.  It is difficult to explain why its jet fuel coefficient is so relatively small 
compared to other airlines.  A simple explanation could be that Alaska Air Group 
implemented a program during the time when jet fuel prices increased from $86.50 to 
$171.58 in nearly twelve months.  Alaska Air Group, like Northwest, has fuel as a 
percentage of operating expenses above the average.  However, the airline has never 
pursued a Chapter 11 filing. 
The regression analysis of US Airways is of limited benefit, since insufficient 
data points are available to perform the calculation for the entire study period.  The 
limited results show that Ret = 0.008 - 0.28Rejt + 1.35Remt + εt (See Table Four).  The 
coefficients are significant at α=.10 (two tailed test).  The R-square of 16% suggests that 
there are many other factors besides jet fuel and S&P 500 that might explain the 
fluctuation in the stock prices.  Available data for US Airways shows that only 4% of its 
fuel requirements were hedged.  In turn, that resulted in a significantly higher jet fuel 
13
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correlation, in contrast with the other airlines.  However, US Airways controlled its fuel 
costs more effectively than the average airline.  Its fuel expenditure as a percentage of 
operating expenses was below the average for the study period.  US Airways filed for 
bankruptcy once during the study period and disposed quickly of those aircraft in its fleet 
with the highest seat-mile costs. 
The regression analysis of Airtran supplied this result: Ret = 0.0006 – 0.04Rejt + 
0.61Remt + εt (See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at α=.10 (two tailed test).  
The R-square of 2% is small to the point of meaninglessness. Worth noting is that Airtran 
hedged a percentage of its fuel requirements similar to that of American Airlines.  
Nevertheless, we encounter a model with no fit. Therefore, there must be some other 
explanation behind the fluctuations of stock prices of Airtran.  During the study period, 
Airtran did not file for bankruptcy protection and its fuel expense as a percentage of 
operating expenses was the highest of all airlines in the studies, a testimony to its ability 
to control costs in other departments.  
The regression analysis of JetBlue should be used with caution in comparison 
with the airline’s peers, since it was not publicly traded prior to the year 2002.  From the 
available data, the following result was obtained:  Ret = 0.0006 – 0.02Rejt + 0.16Remt + εt 
(See Table Four).  The coefficients are significant at α=.10 (two tailed test).  R square 
0.4% does not explain the fluctuation in the price of JetBlue stock as the dependent 
variable is not explained by a model with an R-square of 0.4.  We note that JetBlue 
Airlines never has filed for bankruptcy and has had a hedging program in place from the 
inception of the airline in 2003.  Significant is that JetBlue uses the youngest air fleet of 
14
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all majors. Still, its fuel use as percentage of operating expenses was much greater 
compared to other airlines during the most recent years recorded. 
 
An Alternate Route  
The research shows that, on average, airlines’ stock prices are negatively 
correlated to changes in jet fuel prices.  Therefore, the hypothesis of an inverse 
relationship between airline stock prices and the price of jet fuel finds statistical support.  
As has been demonstrated by the regression analysis, hedging apparently does not have 
an effect on the sensitivity of airline stock prices to fluctuations in jet fuel prices.  
However, we need to caution that this relationship rarely depends solely on the 
proportion of next year’s fuel requirement hedged.  Successful hedging involves correct 
estimation of future pricing (e.g. that the actual market price will be higher than the strike 
price on the day of delivery).   The percentage proportion of fuel requirements hedged is 
not the only factor that may exert significant influence on the movement of an airline’s 
common stock.  Looking at daily returns of jet fuel and stock prices, we do not find a 
significant correlation that can be used to support the theorized sensitivity.  The 
suggestion for further research is to focus on qualitative not quantitative research.  Often, 
investors make their decisions in context of their portfolios, beyond simply a fixed body 
of data used by researchers to explain correlation between hedging and firm value.   
 
Conclusion 
The apparent logical explanation for these results is that investors seek to earn 
abnormal returns and beat the average return in the market.  If no analyst can beat the 
15
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passive strategy, investors will not spend their time and resources on the analysis.  
Instead, they will adopt less expensive passive strategies.  The resulting opportunity will 
create a situation where investors can earn abnormal profits.  The critical assumption is 
that investors make their own decision about how to manage their money.  Thus, rational 
investors who want to beat the average return on the market will not choose to invest in 
the companies that spend their cash flow on hedging.  Simply, hedging, like combinations 
of puts and calls, reduces the range of possible profits and returns for investors.  Also, 
hedging strategy requires cash commitments that could be redistributed in dividends to 
the investors.  Therefore, investors might be less concerned with the fluctuation of jet fuel 
prices, as they hold stock of airlines with no hedging strategy, anticipating earning 
abnormal returns. 
 Most airlines use hedges to some extent to limit their jet fuel risk exposure.  Few 
cover more than one year’s expected requirements and it is not possible to find an airline 
with more than 85% of future needs hedged.  There is not a reason that would contradict 
the economic fundamentals of hedging; airline stock returns are negatively related to 
percentage changes in jet fuel prices, on average.  Even a hedging strategy in place does 
not seem to have any significant effect on airline stock returns.  This might be because 
the investors, when selecting their portfolio, seek a combination of stocks that will reduce 
the overall risk exposure of the portfolio rather than the risk inherent in this or that 
individual firm.   Investors are in a better position to hedge any residual exposure 
independently.  Also, the return on jet fuel prices might be a poor or inappropriate 
indicator.  Since airlines use derivatives to hedge their risk exposure, the spot prices of 
these instruments would be more useful in the model. However, such prices are not 
16
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presently available as hedging contracts are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. It has yet 
to be determined that hedging affects perceived firm value.  If that were the case, all the 
airlines would hedge the maximum amount of future fuel requirements to maximize their 
value. As we have seen, the airline industry does not follow that practice.  More 
importantly, airlines focus on successful hedging, the one that will keep their jet fuel cost 
under control during periods of commodity price turmoil and run-ups. 
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Appendix A 
          TABLE I                                                         Fuel expense as % of operating expense  
Date 
American 
Airlines 
Southwest 
Airlines 
Delta Air 
Lines 
Northwest 
Airlines 
Continental 
Airlines 
Alaska 
Air 
Group 
US 
Airways 
Group 
Airtran 
Holdings JetBlue 
Total 
Average 
1996 13.50% 17.80% 13.00% 14.80% 13.30% 16.00%  21.71%   
1997 12.90% 15.00% 14.00% 14.30% 14.00% 14.50%  21.47%   
1998 10.70% 11.20% 12.00% 10.90% 10.20% 11.40%  16.70%   
1999 10.60% 12.50% 11.00% 11.60% 9.70% 13.30%  26.00%   
2000 14.10% 17.40% 13.00% 16.50% 15.20% 17.40%  25.90% 14.00%  
2001 13.90% 15.60% 12.00% 15.00% 13.50% 14.30%  22.90% 14.20%  
2002 12.50% 14.90% 11.00% 12.70% 12.10% 13.10%  22.00% 14.40%  
2003 14.00% 15.20% 13.00% 14.50% 14.50% 14.50% 11.00% 21.50% 17.80%  
2004 19.20% 16.70% 16.00% 18.70% 15.90% 20.00% 13.40% 24.60% 22.10%  
2005 24.20% 19.80% 23.00% 23.72% 26.70% 24.00% 20.00% 32.90% 29.50%  
Average 14.56% 15.61% 13.80% 15.27% 14.51% 15.85% 14.80% 23.57% 18.67% 16.29% 
 
        TABLE II                                                       Hedging as a % of next year's fuel requirement  
Date 
American 
Airlines 
Southwest 
Airlines 
Delta Air 
Lines 
Northwest 
Airlines 
Continental 
Airlines 
Alaska 
Air 
Group 
US 
Airways 
Group 
Airtran 
Holdings JetBlue 
Total 
Average 
1996 22.00% 30.00% 8.00% 0.00% 24.00% 0.00%  0.00%   
1997 28.00% 25.00% 17.00% 0.00% 24.00% 0.00%  0.00%   
1998 40.00% 30.00% 82.35% 28.00% 24.00% 0.00%  0.00%   
1999 48.00% 77.00% 80.00% 10.00% 25.00% 0.00%  66.60%   
2000 19.00% 56.00% 80.00% 24.00% 24.00% 0.00%  22.00%   
2001 40.00% 80.00% 51.00% 6.00% 23.00% 23.00%  40.00%   
2002 40.00% 60.00% 56.00% 2.00% 0.00% 24.00%  30.00%   
2003 32.00% 83.00% 65.00% 60.00% 23.00% 20.00%  41.00% 45.00%  
2004 15.00% 82.00% 8.00% 0.00% 0.00% 33.00%  29.00% 40.00%  
2005 5.00% 85.00% 0.00% 6.00% 0.00% 28.00% 4.00% 28.00% 20.00%   
Average 28.90% 60.80% 44.74% 13.60% 16.70% 12.80% 4.00% 25.66% 35.00% 26.91% 
 
          TABLE III                                                   Bankruptcy proceedings 
Date 
American 
Airlines 
Southwest 
Airlines 
Delta 
Air 
Lines 
Northwest 
Airlines 
Continental 
Airlines 
Alaska Air 
Group 
US 
Airways 
Group 
Airtran 
Holdings JetBlue 
Before the study period 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
During the study period 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Currently in the bankruptcy 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table IV                                         Individual Statistics 
American Airlines 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.188648875 289.8262105 6.7425E-114 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.000615632 0.824549677 0.409706184 
Jet Fuel -0.181776311 -6.754280666 1.78008E-11 
S&P 500 1.47772549 22.93488702 8.8202E-106 
    
    
Southwest 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.208383928 328.1269486 3.151E-127 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.000518731 1.163077025 0.244909567 
Jet Fuel -0.041558439 -2.585068909 0.009792258 
S&P 500 0.978170367 25.41490107 6.6741E-127 
    
    
Delta 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.156186442 230.7220578 1.16483E-92 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.001157751 -1.649930824 0.09908306 
Jet Fuel -0.115638541 -4.571930206 5.06848E-06 
S&P 500 1.263729064 20.86949705 2.82334E-89 
    
    
Northwest 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.138394952 200.2185432 2.29993E-81 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.001305938 -1.683736387 0.092357819 
Jet Fuel -0.061533276 -2.200939088 0.027831698 
S&P 500 1.327213417 19.82895257 2.2652E-81 
    
    
Continental 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.102497617 142.3542513 2.87666E-59 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.000446989 0.631168194 0.527988418 
Jet Fuel -0.104339374 -4.087357666 4.50113E-05 
S&P 500 0.994002958 16.26458975 1.3044E-56 
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Alaska 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.211254225 333.8571192 3.4043E-129 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.000368678 0.753845519 0.451013179 
Jet Fuel -0.05579474 -3.16500598 0.001569499 
S&P 500 1.078719622 25.55941335 3.5768E-128 
    
    
US Airways 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.16155612 5.780570064 0.005060809 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.008297535 2.743348874 0.008007474 
Jet Fuel  -0.27681979 -2.198109202 0.031810509 
S&P 500 1.345778271 2.956769605 0.00444018 
    
    
Airtran 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.028551789 36.63582376 2.08256E-16 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.000610366 0.730496593 0.465155336 
Jet Fuel -0.040920021 -1.35865791 0.174377931 
S&P 500 0.606773929 8.41515668 6.51761E-17 
    
    
JetBlue 
   
 
R Square F Significance F 
 
0.004133312 1.913365206 0.14816845 
 
 
  
  Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.00065754 0.706341633 0.480154157 
Jet Fuel -0.024121895 -0.6780922 0.497883373 
S&P 500 -0.159144393 -1.868373725 0.062026949 
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